Head

GCC Code Coverage Report

Directory:	./		Exec	Total	Coverage
File:	lib/libcrypto/crypto/../../libssl/src/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_vfy.c	Lines:	95	195	48.7 %
Date:	2016-12-06	Branches:	51	124	41.1 %


/* $OpenBSD: ocsp_vfy.c,v 1.13 2016/07/05 00:21:47 beck Exp $ */
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
 * project 2000.
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */

#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <string.h>

static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
    STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
    unsigned long flags);
static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
    STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
    X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st,
    unsigned long flags);

/* Verify a basic response message */
int
OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st,
    unsigned long flags)
{
	X509 *signer, *x;
	STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
	STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
	X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
	int i, ret = 0;

	ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
	if (!ret) {
		OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
		    OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
		goto end;
	}
	if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
		flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
		EVP_PKEY *skey;

		skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
		if (skey) {
			ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
			EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
		}
		if (!skey || ret <= 0) {
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
			    OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
			goto end;
		}
	}
	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
		int init_res;

		if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
			untrusted = NULL;
		} else if (bs->certs && certs) {
			untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
				if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted,
					sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
					OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
					    ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
					goto end;
				}
			}
		} else
			untrusted = bs->certs;
		init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
		if (!init_res) {
			ret = -1;
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
			goto end;
		}

		X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
		ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
		chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		if (ret <= 0) {
			i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
			    OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
			ERR_asprintf_error_data("Verify error:%s",
			    X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
			goto end;
		}
		if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
			ret = 1;
			goto end;
		}
		/* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
		 * need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
		 */
		ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);

		/* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
		if (ret != 0)
			goto end;

		/* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
		 * check for explicit trust
		 */
		if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
			goto end;

		x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
		if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) !=
			X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
			    OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
			goto end;
		}
		ret = 1;
	}

end:
	if (chain)
		sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
	if (bs->certs && certs)
		sk_X509_free(untrusted);
	return ret;
}

static int
ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
    X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
{
	X509 *signer;
	OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;

	if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
		*psigner = signer;
		return 2;
	}
	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
	    (signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
		*psigner = signer;
		return 1;
	}
	/* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */

	*psigner = NULL;
	return 0;
}

static X509 *
ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
{
	int i;
	unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
	X509 *x;

	/* Easy if lookup by name */
	if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
		return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);

	/* Lookup by key hash */

	/* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
	if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
		return NULL;
	keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
	/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
		x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
		X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
		if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
			return x;
	}
	return NULL;
}

static int
ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
    unsigned long flags)
{
	STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
	X509 *signer, *sca;
	OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
	int i;

	sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;

	if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
		OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER,
		    OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
		return -1;
	}

	/* See if the issuer IDs match. */
	i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);

	/* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
	if (i <= 0)
		return i;

	signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
	/* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
	if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
		sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
		i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
		if (i < 0)
			return i;
		if (i) {
			/* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
			if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags))
				return 1;
			return 0;
		}
	}

	/* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
	return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
}

/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
 * algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
 * If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
 */
static int
ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
{
	OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
	int i, idcount;

	idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
	if (idcount <= 0) {
		OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
		    OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
		return -1;
	}

	cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;

	*ret = NULL;

	for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
		tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
		/* Check to see if IDs match */
		if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
			return 0;
		}
	}

	/* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
	*ret = cid;
	return 1;
}

static int
ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
    STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
{
	/* If only one ID to match then do it */
	if (cid) {
		const EVP_MD *dgst;
		X509_NAME *iname;
		int mdlen;
		unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];

		if (!(dgst =
		    EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))) {
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
			    OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
			return -1;
		}

		mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
		if (mdlen < 0)
			return -1;
		if (cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen ||
		    cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen)
			return 0;
		iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
		if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
			return -1;
		if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
			return 0;
		X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
		if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
			return 0;

		return 1;
	} else {
		/* We have to match the whole lot */
		int i, ret;
		OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;

		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
			tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
			ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
			if (ret <= 0)
				return ret;
		}
		return 1;
	}
}

static int
ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
{
	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
	if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
		return 1;
	OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
	return 0;
}

/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
 * response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
 * against a given trust value.
 */
int
OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
    unsigned long flags)
{
	X509 *signer;
	X509_NAME *nm;
	GENERAL_NAME *gen;
	int ret;
	X509_STORE_CTX ctx;

	if (!req->optionalSignature) {
		OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
		return 0;
	}
	gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
	if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
		OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
		    OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
		return 0;
	}
	nm = gen->d.directoryName;
	ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
	if (ret <= 0) {
		OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
		    OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
		return 0;
	}
	if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
		flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
		EVP_PKEY *skey;

		skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
		ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
		EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
		if (ret <= 0) {
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
			    OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
			return 0;
		}
	}
	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
		int init_res;

		if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
			    NULL);
		else
			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
			    req->optionalSignature->certs);
		if (!init_res) {
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
			return 0;
		}

		X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
		X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
		ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
		X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
		if (ret <= 0) {
			ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
			    OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
			ERR_asprintf_error_data("Verify error:%s",
			    X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
			return 0;
		}
	}
	return 1;
}

static int
ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm,
    STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
{
	X509 *signer;

	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
		signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
		if (signer) {
			*psigner = signer;
			return 1;
		}
	}

	signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
	if (signer) {
		*psigner = signer;
		return 2;
	}
	return 0;
}


Generated by: GCOVR (Version 3.3)

Line	Branch	Exec	Source
1			/* $OpenBSD: ocsp_vfy.c,v 1.13 2016/07/05 00:21:47 beck Exp $ */
2			/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
3			* project 2000.
4			*/
5			/* ====================================================================
6			* Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
7			*
8			* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9			* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10			* are met:
11			*
12			* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13			* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14			*
15			* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16			* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17			* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18			* distribution.
19			*
20			* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21			* software must display the following acknowledgment:
22			* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23			* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
24			*
25			* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26			* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27			* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28			* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
29			*
30			* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31			* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32			* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
33			*
34			* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
35			* acknowledgment:
36			* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37			* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
38			*
39			* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40			* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41			* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42			* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43			* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44			* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45			* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46			* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47			* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48			* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49			* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50			* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51			* ====================================================================
52			*
53			* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54			* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55			* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
56			*
57			*/
58
59			#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
60			#include <openssl/err.h>
61			#include <string.h>
62
63			static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 *psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP bs,
64			STACK_OF(X509) certs, X509_STORE st, unsigned long flags);
65			static X509 ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
66			static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP bs, STACK_OF(X509) chain,
67			unsigned long flags);
68			static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) sresp, OCSP_CERTID *ret);
69			static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 cert, OCSP_CERTID cid,
70			STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
71			static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
72			static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 *psigner, OCSP_REQUEST req,
73			X509_NAME nm, STACK_OF(X509) certs, X509_STORE *st,
74			unsigned long flags);
75
76			/* Verify a basic response message */
77			int
78			OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP bs, STACK_OF(X509) certs, X509_STORE *st,
79			unsigned long flags)
80		2	{
81			X509 signer, x;
82		2	STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
83		2	STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
84			X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
85		2	int i, ret = 0;
86
87		2	ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
88	✗✓	2	if (!ret) {
89			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
90			OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
91			goto end;
92			}
93	✓✓✗✓	2	if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
94			flags \|= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
95	✓✗	2	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
96			EVP_PKEY *skey;
97
98		2	skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
99	✓✗	2	if (skey) {
100		2	ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
101		2	EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
102			}
103	✗✓	2	if (!skey \|\| ret <= 0) {
104			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
105			OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
106			goto end;
107			}
108			}
109	✓✗	2	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
110			int init_res;
111
112	✗✓	2	if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) {
113			untrusted = NULL;
114	✓✓	2	} else if (bs->certs && certs) {
115		1	untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
116	✓✓	3	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
117	✗✓	2	if (!sk_X509_push(untrusted,
118			sk_X509_value(certs, i))) {
119			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
120			ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
121			goto end;
122			}
123			}
124			} else
125		1	untrusted = bs->certs;
126		2	init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, untrusted);
127	✗✓	2	if (!init_res) {
128			ret = -1;
129			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
130			goto end;
131			}
132
133		2	X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
134		2	ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
135		2	chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
136		2	X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
137	✗✓	2	if (ret <= 0) {
138			i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
139			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
140			OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
141			ERR_asprintf_error_data("Verify error:%s",
142			X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
143			goto end;
144			}
145	✗✓	2	if (flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) {
146			ret = 1;
147			goto end;
148			}
149			/* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
150			* need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
151			*/
152		2	ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
153
154			/* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
155	✓✗	2	if (ret != 0)
156		2	goto end;
157
158			/* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
159			* check for explicit trust
160			*/
161			if (flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT)
162			goto end;
163
164			x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
165			if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) !=
166			X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
167			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,
168			OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
169			goto end;
170			}
171			ret = 1;
172			}
173
174		2	end:
175	✓✗	2	if (chain)
176		2	sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
177	✓✓	2	if (bs->certs && certs)
178		1	sk_X509_free(untrusted);
179		2	return ret;
180			}
181
182			static int
183			ocsp_find_signer(X509 *psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
184			X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
185		2	{
186			X509 *signer;
187		2	OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;
188
189	✓✓	2	if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid))) {
190		1	*psigner = signer;
191		1	return 2;
192			}
193	✓✗✓✗	1	if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
194			(signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
195		1	*psigner = signer;
196		1	return 1;
197			}
198			/* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
199
200			*psigner = NULL;
201			return 0;
202			}
203
204			static X509 *
205			ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) certs, OCSP_RESPID id)
206		3	{
207			int i;
208			unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
209			X509 *x;
210
211			/* Easy if lookup by name */
212	✗✓	3	if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
213			return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
214
215			/* Lookup by key hash */
216
217			/* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
218	✗✓	3	if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
219			return NULL;
220		3	keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
221			/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
222	✓✓	6	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
223		5	x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
224		5	X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
225	✓✓	5	if (!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
226		2	return x;
227			}
228		1	return NULL;
229			}
230
231			static int
232			ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP bs, STACK_OF(X509) chain,
233			unsigned long flags)
234		2	{
235			STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
236			X509 signer, sca;
237		2	OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
238			int i;
239
240		2	sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
241
242	✗✓	2	if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
243			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER,
244			OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
245			return -1;
246			}
247
248			/* See if the issuer IDs match. */
249		2	i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
250
251			/* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
252	✗✓	2	if (i <= 0)
253			return i;
254
255		2	signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
256			/* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
257	✓✗	2	if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
258		2	sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
259		2	i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
260	✗✓	2	if (i < 0)
261			return i;
262	✓✓	2	if (i) {
263			/* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
264	✓✗	1	if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags))
265		1	return 1;
266			return 0;
267			}
268			}
269
270			/* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
271		1	return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
272			}
273
274			/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
275			* algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
276			* If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
277			*/
278			static int
279			ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) sresp, OCSP_CERTID *ret)
280		2	{
281			OCSP_CERTID tmpid, cid;
282			int i, idcount;
283
284		2	idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
285	✗✓	2	if (idcount <= 0) {
286			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS,
287			OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
288			return -1;
289			}
290
291		2	cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
292
293		2	*ret = NULL;
294
295	✗✓	2	for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
296			tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
297			/* Check to see if IDs match */
298			if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
299			return 0;
300			}
301			}
302
303			/* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
304		2	*ret = cid;
305		2	return 1;
306			}
307
308			static int
309			ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 cert, OCSP_CERTID cid,
310			STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
311		3	{
312			/* If only one ID to match then do it */
313	✓✗	3	if (cid) {
314			const EVP_MD *dgst;
315			X509_NAME *iname;
316			int mdlen;
317			unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
318
319	✗✓	3	if (!(dgst =
320			EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))) {
321			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID,
322			OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
323			return -1;
324			}
325
326		3	mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
327	✗✓	3	if (mdlen < 0)
328			return -1;
329	✓✗✗✓	3	if (cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen \|\|
330			cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen)
331			return 0;
332		3	iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
333	✗✓	3	if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
334			return -1;
335	✓✓	3	if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
336		1	return 0;
337		2	X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
338	✗✓	2	if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
339			return 0;
340
341		2	return 1;
342			} else {
343			/* We have to match the whole lot */
344			int i, ret;
345			OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
346
347			for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
348			tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
349			ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
350			if (ret <= 0)
351			return ret;
352			}
353			return 1;
354			}
355			}
356
357			static int
358			ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
359		1	{
360		1	X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
361	✓✗✓✗	1	if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && (x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
362		1	return 1;
363			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
364			return 0;
365			}
366
367			/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
368			* response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
369			* against a given trust value.
370			*/
371			int
372			OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST req, STACK_OF(X509) certs, X509_STORE *store,
373			unsigned long flags)
374			{
375			X509 *signer;
376			X509_NAME *nm;
377			GENERAL_NAME *gen;
378			int ret;
379			X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
380
381			if (!req->optionalSignature) {
382			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
383			return 0;
384			}
385			gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
386			if (!gen \|\| gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
387			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
388			OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
389			return 0;
390			}
391			nm = gen->d.directoryName;
392			ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
393			if (ret <= 0) {
394			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
395			OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
396			return 0;
397			}
398			if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
399			flags \|= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
400			if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS)) {
401			EVP_PKEY *skey;
402
403			skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
404			ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
405			EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
406			if (ret <= 0) {
407			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
408			OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
409			return 0;
410			}
411			}
412			if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY)) {
413			int init_res;
414
415			if (flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
416			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
417			NULL);
418			else
419			init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
420			req->optionalSignature->certs);
421			if (!init_res) {
422			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
423			return 0;
424			}
425
426			X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
427			X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
428			ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
429			X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
430			if (ret <= 0) {
431			ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
432			OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,
433			OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
434			ERR_asprintf_error_data("Verify error:%s",
435			X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
436			return 0;
437			}
438			}
439			return 1;
440			}
441
442			static int
443			ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 *psigner, OCSP_REQUEST req, X509_NAME *nm,
444			STACK_OF(X509) certs, X509_STORE st, unsigned long flags)
445			{
446			X509 *signer;
447
448			if (!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN)) {
449			signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
450			if (signer) {
451			*psigner = signer;
452			return 1;
453			}
454			}
455
456			signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
457			if (signer) {
458			*psigner = signer;
459			return 2;
460			}
461			return 0;
462			}