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GCC Code Coverage Report

Directory:	./		Exec	Total	Coverage
File:	sbin/isakmpd/ike_aggressive.c	Lines:	0	31	0.0 %
Date:	2017-11-07	Branches:	0	24	0.0 %


/* $OpenBSD: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.11 2010/06/29 19:50:16 reyk Exp $	 */
/* $EOM: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.4 2000/01/31 22:33:45 niklas Exp $	 */

/*
 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.  All rights reserved.
 * Copyright (c) 1999 Angelos D. Keromytis.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

/*
 * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems.
 */

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#include "attribute.h"
#include "conf.h"
#include "constants.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "doi.h"
#include "exchange.h"
#include "hash.h"
#include "ike_auth.h"
#include "ike_aggressive.h"
#include "ike_phase_1.h"
#include "ipsec.h"
#include "ipsec_doi.h"
#include "isakmp.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "message.h"
#include "nat_traversal.h"
#include "prf.h"
#include "sa.h"
#include "transport.h"
#include "util.h"

static int	initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
static int	initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
static int	initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *);
static int	responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
static int	responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
static int	responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *);

int (*ike_aggressive_initiator[])(struct message *) = {
	initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
	initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
	initiator_send_AUTH
};

int (*ike_aggressive_responder[])(struct message *) = {
	responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
	responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
	responder_recv_AUTH
};

/* Offer a set of transforms to the responder in the MSG message.  */
static int
initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg)
{
	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_SA(msg))
		return -1;

	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_KE_NONCE(msg))
		return -1;

	return ike_phase_1_send_ID(msg);
}

/* Figure out what transform the responder chose.  */
static int
initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
{
	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_SA(msg))
		return -1;

	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_KE_NONCE(msg))
		return -1;

	return ike_phase_1_recv_ID_AUTH(msg);
}

static int
initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *msg)
{
	msg->exchange->flags |= EXCHANGE_FLAG_ENCRYPT;

	if (ike_phase_1_send_AUTH(msg))
		return -1;

	/*
	 * RFC 2407 4.6.3 says that, among others, INITIAL-CONTACT MUST NOT
	 * be sent in Aggressive Mode.  This leaves us with the choice of
	 * doing it in an informational exchange of its own with no delivery
	 * guarantee or in the first Quick Mode, or not at all.
	 * draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-01.txt has some text that requires
	 * INITIAL-CONTACT in phase 1, thus contradicting what we learned
	 * above.  I will bring this up in the IPsec list.  For now we don't
	 * do INITIAL-CONTACT at all when using aggressive mode.
         */
	return 0;
}

/*
 * Accept a set of transforms offered by the initiator and chose one we can
 * handle.  Also accept initiator's public DH value, nonce and ID.
 */
static int
responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg)
{
	if (ike_phase_1_responder_recv_SA(msg))
		return -1;

	if (ike_phase_1_recv_ID(msg))
		return -1;

	return ike_phase_1_recv_KE_NONCE(msg);
}

/*
 * Reply with the transform we chose.  Send our public DH value and a nonce
 * to the initiator.
 */
static int
responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
{
	/* Add the SA payload with the transform that was chosen.  */
	if (ike_phase_1_responder_send_SA(msg))
		return -1;

	/* XXX Should we really just use the initiator's nonce size?  */
	if (ike_phase_1_send_KE_NONCE(msg, msg->exchange->nonce_i_len))
		return -1;

	if (ike_phase_1_post_exchange_KE_NONCE(msg))
		return -1;

	return ike_phase_1_responder_send_ID_AUTH(msg);
}

/*
 * Reply with the transform we chose.  Send our public DH value and a nonce
 * to the initiator.
 */
static int
responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *msg)
{
	if (ike_phase_1_recv_AUTH(msg))
		return -1;

	/* Aggressive: Check for NAT-D payloads and contents.  */
	if (msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER)
		(void)nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d(msg);
	return 0;
}


Generated by: GCOVR (Version 3.3)

Line	Branch	Exec	Source
1			/* $OpenBSD: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.11 2010/06/29 19:50:16 reyk Exp $ */
2			/* $EOM: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.4 2000/01/31 22:33:45 niklas Exp $ */
3
4			/*
5			* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved.
6			* Copyright (c) 1999 Angelos D. Keromytis. All rights reserved.
7			*
8			* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9			* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10			* are met:
11			* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12			* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13			* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14			* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15			* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16			*
17			* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
18			* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
19			* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
20			* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
21			* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
22			* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
23			* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
24			* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
25			* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
26			* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
27			*/
28
29			/*
30			* This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems.
31			*/
32
33			#include <sys/types.h>
34			#include <netinet/in.h>
35			#include <stdlib.h>
36			#include <string.h>
37
38			#include "attribute.h"
39			#include "conf.h"
40			#include "constants.h"
41			#include "crypto.h"
42			#include "dh.h"
43			#include "doi.h"
44			#include "exchange.h"
45			#include "hash.h"
46			#include "ike_auth.h"
47			#include "ike_aggressive.h"
48			#include "ike_phase_1.h"
49			#include "ipsec.h"
50			#include "ipsec_doi.h"
51			#include "isakmp.h"
52			#include "log.h"
53			#include "message.h"
54			#include "nat_traversal.h"
55			#include "prf.h"
56			#include "sa.h"
57			#include "transport.h"
58			#include "util.h"
59
60			static int initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
61			static int initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
62			static int initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *);
63			static int responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
64			static int responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
65			static int responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *);
66
67			int (ike_aggressive_initiator[])(struct message ) = {
68			initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
69			initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
70			initiator_send_AUTH
71			};
72
73			int (ike_aggressive_responder[])(struct message ) = {
74			responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
75			responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
76			responder_recv_AUTH
77			};
78
79			/* Offer a set of transforms to the responder in the MSG message. */
80			static int
81			initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg)
82			{
83			if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_SA(msg))
84			return -1;
85
86			if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_KE_NONCE(msg))
87			return -1;
88
89			return ike_phase_1_send_ID(msg);
90			}
91
92			/* Figure out what transform the responder chose. */
93			static int
94			initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
95			{
96			if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_SA(msg))
97			return -1;
98
99			if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_KE_NONCE(msg))
100			return -1;
101
102			return ike_phase_1_recv_ID_AUTH(msg);
103			}
104
105			static int
106			initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *msg)
107			{
108			msg->exchange->flags \|= EXCHANGE_FLAG_ENCRYPT;
109
110			if (ike_phase_1_send_AUTH(msg))
111			return -1;
112
113			/*
114			* RFC 2407 4.6.3 says that, among others, INITIAL-CONTACT MUST NOT
115			* be sent in Aggressive Mode. This leaves us with the choice of
116			* doing it in an informational exchange of its own with no delivery
117			* guarantee or in the first Quick Mode, or not at all.
118			* draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-01.txt has some text that requires
119			* INITIAL-CONTACT in phase 1, thus contradicting what we learned
120			* above. I will bring this up in the IPsec list. For now we don't
121			* do INITIAL-CONTACT at all when using aggressive mode.
122			*/
123			return 0;
124			}
125
126			/*
127			* Accept a set of transforms offered by the initiator and chose one we can
128			* handle. Also accept initiator's public DH value, nonce and ID.
129			*/
130			static int
131			responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg)
132			{
133			if (ike_phase_1_responder_recv_SA(msg))
134			return -1;
135
136			if (ike_phase_1_recv_ID(msg))
137			return -1;
138
139			return ike_phase_1_recv_KE_NONCE(msg);
140			}
141
142			/*
143			* Reply with the transform we chose. Send our public DH value and a nonce
144			* to the initiator.
145			*/
146			static int
147			responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
148			{
149			/* Add the SA payload with the transform that was chosen. */
150			if (ike_phase_1_responder_send_SA(msg))
151			return -1;
152
153			/* XXX Should we really just use the initiator's nonce size? */
154			if (ike_phase_1_send_KE_NONCE(msg, msg->exchange->nonce_i_len))
155			return -1;
156
157			if (ike_phase_1_post_exchange_KE_NONCE(msg))
158			return -1;
159
160			return ike_phase_1_responder_send_ID_AUTH(msg);
161			}
162
163			/*
164			* Reply with the transform we chose. Send our public DH value and a nonce
165			* to the initiator.
166			*/
167			static int
168			responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *msg)
169			{
170			if (ike_phase_1_recv_AUTH(msg))
171			return -1;
172
173			/* Aggressive: Check for NAT-D payloads and contents. */
174			if (msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER)
175			(void)nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d(msg);
176			return 0;
177			}