GCC Code Coverage Report
Directory: ./ Exec Total Coverage
File: sbin/isakmpd/ike_aggressive.c Lines: 0 31 0.0 %
Date: 2017-11-13 Branches: 0 24 0.0 %

Line Branch Exec Source
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/* $OpenBSD: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.11 2010/06/29 19:50:16 reyk Exp $	 */
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/* $EOM: ike_aggressive.c,v 1.4 2000/01/31 22:33:45 niklas Exp $	 */
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/*
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 * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.  All rights reserved.
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 * Copyright (c) 1999 Angelos D. Keromytis.  All rights reserved.
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 *
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 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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 * are met:
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 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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 *
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 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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 */
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/*
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 * This code was written under funding by Ericsson Radio Systems.
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 */
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "attribute.h"
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#include "conf.h"
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#include "constants.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "dh.h"
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#include "doi.h"
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#include "exchange.h"
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#include "hash.h"
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#include "ike_auth.h"
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#include "ike_aggressive.h"
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#include "ike_phase_1.h"
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#include "ipsec.h"
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#include "ipsec_doi.h"
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#include "isakmp.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "message.h"
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#include "nat_traversal.h"
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#include "prf.h"
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#include "sa.h"
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#include "transport.h"
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#include "util.h"
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static int	initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
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static int	initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
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static int	initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *);
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static int	responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *);
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static int	responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *);
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static int	responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *);
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int (*ike_aggressive_initiator[])(struct message *) = {
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	initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
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	initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
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	initiator_send_AUTH
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};
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int (*ike_aggressive_responder[])(struct message *) = {
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	responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID,
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	responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH,
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	responder_recv_AUTH
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};
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/* Offer a set of transforms to the responder in the MSG message.  */
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static int
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initiator_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg)
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{
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	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_SA(msg))
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		return -1;
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	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_send_KE_NONCE(msg))
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		return -1;
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	return ike_phase_1_send_ID(msg);
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}
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/* Figure out what transform the responder chose.  */
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static int
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initiator_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
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{
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	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_SA(msg))
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		return -1;
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	if (ike_phase_1_initiator_recv_KE_NONCE(msg))
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		return -1;
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	return ike_phase_1_recv_ID_AUTH(msg);
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}
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static int
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initiator_send_AUTH(struct message *msg)
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{
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	msg->exchange->flags |= EXCHANGE_FLAG_ENCRYPT;
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	if (ike_phase_1_send_AUTH(msg))
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		return -1;
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	/*
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	 * RFC 2407 4.6.3 says that, among others, INITIAL-CONTACT MUST NOT
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	 * be sent in Aggressive Mode.  This leaves us with the choice of
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	 * doing it in an informational exchange of its own with no delivery
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	 * guarantee or in the first Quick Mode, or not at all.
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	 * draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-01.txt has some text that requires
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	 * INITIAL-CONTACT in phase 1, thus contradicting what we learned
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	 * above.  I will bring this up in the IPsec list.  For now we don't
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	 * do INITIAL-CONTACT at all when using aggressive mode.
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         */
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	return 0;
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}
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/*
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 * Accept a set of transforms offered by the initiator and chose one we can
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 * handle.  Also accept initiator's public DH value, nonce and ID.
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 */
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static int
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responder_recv_SA_KE_NONCE_ID(struct message *msg)
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{
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	if (ike_phase_1_responder_recv_SA(msg))
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		return -1;
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	if (ike_phase_1_recv_ID(msg))
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		return -1;
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	return ike_phase_1_recv_KE_NONCE(msg);
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}
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/*
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 * Reply with the transform we chose.  Send our public DH value and a nonce
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 * to the initiator.
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 */
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static int
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responder_send_SA_KE_NONCE_ID_AUTH(struct message *msg)
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{
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	/* Add the SA payload with the transform that was chosen.  */
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	if (ike_phase_1_responder_send_SA(msg))
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		return -1;
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	/* XXX Should we really just use the initiator's nonce size?  */
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	if (ike_phase_1_send_KE_NONCE(msg, msg->exchange->nonce_i_len))
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		return -1;
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	if (ike_phase_1_post_exchange_KE_NONCE(msg))
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		return -1;
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	return ike_phase_1_responder_send_ID_AUTH(msg);
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}
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/*
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 * Reply with the transform we chose.  Send our public DH value and a nonce
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 * to the initiator.
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 */
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static int
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responder_recv_AUTH(struct message *msg)
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{
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	if (ike_phase_1_recv_AUTH(msg))
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		return -1;
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	/* Aggressive: Check for NAT-D payloads and contents.  */
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	if (msg->exchange->flags & EXCHANGE_FLAG_NAT_T_CAP_PEER)
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		(void)nat_t_exchange_check_nat_d(msg);
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	return 0;
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}